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ABSTRACT
In contrast to previous studies which have examined the impact of
Right—to—Work (RTW) laws on the level or stock of union membership, this
paper examines their impact on the most updated flow into membershipand
the organizing of workers through certified elections. Since detailed
annual data are available by state, we are able to estimate an accelerator
model of the flow into unionism, and adjust for possible omitted variable
and simultaneity bias. The results show dramatic falls in organizing
immediately after the passage of a RTW law, with more moderate declines
in later years, just as an accelerator model could predict. Overall, the
results are consistent with a 5—10 percent reduction in unionism as a
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(617) 495—1121Perhaps no controversy in recent American labor relations has
catalyzed such confrontation or stirred such strong emotions as the
battle over 'right-to-work" (RTW) laws. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments
to the Wagner Act granted states the power to pass laws which outlaw the
union shop --acontract provision which requires new employees to join
and pay dues to the union.1 Table 1 displays the states where laws have
been passed and the date of passage. A few states passed laws prior to
1947 but their legal status ws in jeopardy until Taft-Hartley.
The philosophical debate turns on the classic confrontation between
freedom and free riders. Unions certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) as the bargaining acient for a group of workers known as the
bargaining unit must represent all the employees in the unit in negotiations
and grievance handling, whether or not they join the union. Dependinci
on one's perspective then, union security clauses either ensure that
workers pay their fair share of representation costs or force them to
join an organization which they do not necessarily favor.
The controversy over these laws is a puzzle to many labor economists
because most recent studies have found that RTW laws have little real
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impact on the level of union membership in a state.Most authors
conclude, to paraphrase the words of Fredrick Meyers in l959, that the
laws are symbol not substance.
The important academic question involves the quantitative impact of
RIW laws on unions. Most previous studies have examined the impact of
these laws on the level (or stock) of union membership in a state.
In contrast we explore the impact of the laws on union organizing --
aflow into organizing. By focusing on the flows rather than stocks, weTABLE 1
States With Right-to-Work Laws






















can simultaneously examine two questions. We can of course collect
evidence of the impact of RTW laws on organizing itself. And we can qain
considerable insight into the impact of the laws on the level of unionism
since adjustments to the stock must come in the form of flows. Moreover
our emphasis on organizing provides us with an opportunity to overcome
some of the methodological problems which have confronted previous authors.
It is our finding that the number of workers in newly organized
bargaining units is substantilly reduced in the first decade after
passage of a right-to-work law, particularly in the first five years.
The reduction arises largely from a shrinking in the number of certifi-
cation elections held and from a reduction in the average number of workers
in each new unit.In later years the effects are relatively small.
Our results suggest that a decade after passacie, the reduced organizing
will have lead to a 5% reduction in the number of union members, and our
results are consistent with a prediction that the 5% reduction is permanent.
Nonetheless our data does not allow definitive statements about the long
term effects the laws have on the level of unionism in a state partially
because we do not observe flows out of unionism and partially because
of uncertainty about the exact size of the long term impact on new organizinq.
We begin with a discussion of stock models of union membership and
a discussion of some of the problems which have confronted previous authors.
We discuss an alternative approach which focuses on flows. We describe
our model and its specification. We present results for all fifty states
and then for seven states where data are available to allow controls
for fixed effects and for a rough test for simultaneity/exogeneity.
Next we decompose our dependent variable into several components to-4-
examine the mechanisms whereby unionism is reduced. We conclude with
a discussion of the results and their implications.
Stock Models of Unionism
We take as our starting point the standard reduced form' model of the
stock of union membership which 'is common in the literature on the level
of union membership and which has been used commonly in the right-to-work
research. The proportion of workers who are union members in a state
is thought to be a function of a variety of exogenous variables including
demographic characteristics of the labor force, the tastes and preferences
of both workers and employers, economic conditions, and the presence
or absence of a right-to-work law. For simplicity of exposition we
represent this function as linear. Obviously this function could be





where U., =Numberof union workers in state i
1attimet
LF1t =Sizeof the labor force
=Vectorof exogenous variables
RTW.t =Dummyvariable equal to one if the
1statehas a right-to-work law
=Errorterm
This equation can be easily estimated in cross section even if data
are available for only a single year. When such equations are estimated the-5—
RTW coefficient is typically moderately sized (around -.10) and significant.
There are several obvious problems with such a specification, most notably
omitted variable bias and simultaneity.
Omitted Variable Bias
The first problem is that measured variables included in the spec-
ification may not fully capture differences across states in attitudes
toward unions. Since a populous with strong anti-union attitudes is likely
to resist union organizing attempts and is also more likely to support
the passage of a RTW law, the RTW coefficient may spuriously capture the
impact of omitted attitudes, tastes, and preferences. The law itself
might have no impact, but states with such laws tend to be hostile toward
unions and thus we see a non-zero coefficient.
The obvious solution to this problem is to exploit time-series
cross sectional data and allow for fixed state effects.4 In a two
period regression this amounts to a before/after type experiment. Unfor-
tunately, comparable data on the stock of union membership before and
after the passage of RTW laws are not available in most states. Membership
data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) become available
only after 1964, nearly twenty years after the passage of many of the laws.
Prior to that the only state data available are those created by Troy
for 1939 and 1953. Comparisons between the BLS and Troy data are difficult
because Troy gathered his data from the financial records of unions whereas
the BLS data are based on union self-reporting of their membership. The
BLS figures are likely to overstate union membership relative to Troy,
particularly in RN states where many workers are covered under collectivebargaining contracts negotiated by unions but do not pay union dues.
Indeed, Troy specifically cautions against comparison of his data and
BLS information in assessing the impact of RTW laws.5
Even ignoring these comparison problems, it seems unreasonable to
assume that omitted state differences in attitudes were roughly constant
between 1936 and 1964. Small impacts caused by the law might easily be
lost in the changing attitudes of the populous.
Simultaneity
Other authors have wrestled with issues of causality and simultaneity.
The fear is that in states where unions command a larger share of the
work force, their political power is greater and thus they can influence
whether or not a right-to—work law is passed. Although this is arguably
similar to the omitted variable bias problem, it is conceptually distinct,
The solution proposed by several authors is to estimate cross sectional,
simultaneous equations models where the level of union membership and the
probability of the state having a RTW law is estimated simultaneously.
The problem with these models is that identification is achieved either
throughthe exclusion of one or several variables or by exploiting functional
form assumptions. Both methods have troubling implicatons. For example,
Mooreand Newman6 include the percentage of the work force which is non-
agricultural and the population density in their equation which predicts
the presence or absence of a RTW law, but exclude these in their second
equation which explains the level of union membership. This exclusion
does not have obvious economic appeal. By contrast Warren andStrauss7
estimate a mixed logit model which requires no exclusions where identifica-
tion can be made by exploiting non-linearities in the system. Identification-7-
through functional form is always troubling. And in this case the esti-
mation technique constrains the coefficient on the RN variable to be
exactly equal to the coefficient on union membership in the RTW equation
times the variance of the error term in the union equation, a restriction
which also lacks economic appeal.
A Flows Approach
We propose an alternative to the stock approach which exploits the
fact that data are available annually on the number of workers organized
under union certification elections certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Because our data are consistent over time, and because
flows can be a very sensitive indicator of a changed environment, this
approach allows us to conduct a more powerful test of the impact of RTW
laws than might be achieved with stock models. We are able to control
for omitted variable bias and to test for simultaneity bias.
Potential bargaining units are established by the NLRB in particular
plants or for particular crafts. A union is certified by the NLRB as
the sole bargaining agent for a unit either by winning a certification
election or, much less comonly, through voluntary recognition of a union
by the employer. Under the election process, when at least 30% of the
workers in a potential bargaining unit sign organization cards asking to
be represented by a union, the NLRB will supervise a certification election.
If the union captures a majority of the votes cast, the union is certified
as the sole bargaining agent for all the workers in the unit regardless
of whether or not they join the union. Data on the number of elections
are available yearly by state after 1946, and on the number of workers
in newly certified bargaining units after 1950.-8-
Once established, these units remian unionized until the firm moves,
goes out of business, is sold to an employer who does not recognize the
union, or until a union decertification election is held.In a state
with a constant labor force, unions can grow either by having new units
certified, or by growing along with firms that have already been organized.
Unionsdecline when they are decertified and when the firms or trades
towhich they are linked shrink. If thelabor force is growing, unions
willdecline relatively if tftey are unsuccessful in organizing the new
workplaces and the workers in them. Even in steady state equilibrium
then there will be a need for new organizing since declines caused by
old firms shrinking or closing must be offset by organizing.
When conditions change, and the equilibrium level of union membership
is higher or lower than the existing level, the stock must adjust somehow.
In many ways, the adjustment process is similar to that in a putty-clay
model of capital. Once established, bargaining units tend to remain in
place and decay or depreciate slowly because the units fortunes are largely
tied to the fortunes of the firm. Each year a few union plants go out
of business. The stock would be reduced if organizing did not compensate.
Just as in such models of capital, organizing (or new investment in union
capital stock) will be sensitive to changes in the union climate. And
changes which lead to a permanent reduction in the equilibrium level
of unionism will lead to dramatic falls in new organizing until the
stock has adjusted.









[similar to equation (1)]
LFt =Laborforce
U11 =Actuallevel of unionization
="Decay"rate of existing units
Suppose for example that passage of a RTW law actually caused the
equilibrium level of union membership as a percent of the labor force
to fall by 3 percentage points, say from 33% to 30%. Suppose the decay
rate was 5%, and that the size of the labor force is unchanaing. Then
prior to passage of the RTW law, 1.65% of the workforce would have to be
organized each year to maintain a steady state. After the law is passed,
if the rate of adjustment was .4, we would expect to see new organizing
fall to .45% in the year immediately following passage. (See Figure 1).
After the initial fall, organizing would increase slowly and would ultimately
stabilize at a new level of 1.5%. Thus in the first five years after
passage, organizing would be depressed by nearly 40% on average.In the
next five organizing would be reduced about 20%. And ultimately it ought to
be 10% lower overall than previously. Such large changes in organizing
ought to be easy to observe and measure.
By contrast the stock of union workers would decline by just-10-
FIGURE 1
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.6 percentage points or 2% in the first years and the decline would reach
10% only asymtotically. These smaller changes will be much harder to
detect. A primary advantage of the organizing data then is the much
greater sensitivity of flows to a changed environment. In addition, the
fact that annual data are available starting in 1951 means that in seven
states we can perform strong tests for omitted variable bias and simultan-
eity. We can easily allow for fixed effects over a relatively short time
series to control for omitte variable bias. And we can exploit the basic
ideas behind Granger/Sims causality tests to explore the seriousness of
simultaneity problems in the specification.
We can estimate a model of new organizing and allow for fixed
state effects. This controls for any time invariant state to state
differences in tastes which might account for the passage of RTW laws in
some states, but not in others. Data are available on oroanizing both
before and after passage of RTW laws in the seven states which passed
such laws after 1955. For these states, we can estimate a fixed effects
model to examine the importance of omitted taste variables in the results
of the 50 state equation.
It is possible, though, that tastes had changed over time in these
seven states or that unions lost power. These changes could explain why
a RTW law was finally passed. Thus, we might expect to see less organizing
in the period following passage of a RTW law because the mere passage
of the law indicates that anti-union sentiments were rising. Here again,
the law need have no real impact; it might merely reflect omitted variables
which influence union organizing. Since the omitted variables are changing
over time, fixed effects models will not adequately capture them.-12-
The basic idea behind Granqer/Sims type causality tests is that events
cannot have an impact before they have occurred. If RTW laws have a real
impact on unionization, then their impact ouqht to be felt only after
the passage of the laws. By contrast, if passage of a RTW law indicates
the culmination of growing anti-union sentiments, organizing declines ought
to be as significant in the years just prior to passage as just after
passage. Assuming these new anti-union sentiments level off and a new
lower equilibrium level of union membership exists, the alternative pattern
is illustrated in Figure 2. So the important test is whether or not
organizing was diminished in the period just prior to passage as well
as the period just afterward.
With annual data, then, we can impose rather strict tests of both
omitted variable bias and simultaneity. Fixed effects can be used to
test for omitted variable bias. A leading indicator of impending RN
passage can be used to test for simultaneity. If we do in fact observe
the pattern displayed in Figure 1, rather than some other pattern, it
is powerful evidence that RN laws do in fact have real impact.
In fact since stock and flow models always have a correspondence,
these same methods could be applied to accurate annual data on the stock
of membership. The advantages to using an organizing model rather than
one based on stocks is that annual data are available and thiss flow
ought to be very sensitive to changes in the union environment. A 50%
change in a measured variable is much easier to capture than a 5% change.
A Model of Union Organizing
We can begin with a simplistic model derived from equations (1) and





Although this instantaneous adjustment model is unrealistic, it
does point out that new organizaton is influenced by changes in exogenous
variables (including RTW), by the need to organize new workers when
the labor force is growing, and by the need to replace members lost to
the various flows out of unionism. A model that allows for non-instantan-
eous adjustment would look stmilar but it would include many lagged values
of X and RTW and LF.
We experimented with a variety of specifications involving a consider-
able number of laqged independent variables, non-linear functional forms,
and multiple interactions. Ultimately we found a straightforward log-
linear specification, which included both levels of the explanatory
variables (the Xs) and the change in these variables in the previous
five years as the independent variables, to be the most stable and intelliq-
ible. For obvious reasons, we concentrated particular attention on our
RTW variable.
We ran state cross-section annual time-series regressions for the
period from 1951 to 1977. Our primary dependent variable is the natural
log of ORG/LF --thenumber of employees in bargaining units where unions
won an NLRB election divided by the non-agricultural labor force in the
state. As independent variables we have included variables which measure
demographic and industrial structure, local tastes and preferences, economic
conditions, and the governmental/legal environment.
Demographic characteristics of workers are emphasized as important
determinants of the levels of union membership by virtually every student
of union membership.-14-
The most commonly cited factors are sex and race. Women typically display
weaker labor force attachment than men. If their expected tenure is
shorter than that of their male counterparts, the present value of long
term gains to unionism is reduced so that the up-front organizational
costs are likely to be a greater deterrent to organizing a union.8
Blacks, on the other hand, may be more inclined toward unions as a defensive
reaction to employer discrimination.9 In addition, urban residents are
generally considered more likely to organize)0 Apparently, small towns
suffer diseconomies of scale and/or different attitudes toward unionism.
In our models, %FEMALE and %BLACKS and %URBAN represent the proportion of
the non-agricultural labor force which is female, black, living in urbanized
areas, respectively.
Structural differences in the nature of the product or factor markets,
the nature of technology, and the "strategic position" of workers is the
cornerstone of the work of Dunlop, Shuster, and many others who analyze
union These variables have obvious impact on the short and
long-run elasticity of demand for labor plus important implications for the
dynamics of relations between labor and management. The proportion of workers
in each one digit industry and occupation was therefore included in many of
our regressions. We also tested a more crude structural variable --%BCW--
thepercentage of the state's non-agricultural work force which is in
blue—collar occupations.
None of the demographic and structural variables are available
annually in the early period of our sample. Therefore, we collected the
information from the decennial Census of Population and used straight
line extrapolation to fill in the missing data. This methodology is—l 5-
unlikely to create a severe errors in variables problem since these
measures change only slowly over time.
Local tastes and preferences have generally been cited to account
for the large differences in the level of unionization across states.
Studies of right-to-work laws have emphasized the importance of local
attitudes in stimulating RTW laws and in holding down the level of unionism.
This is the heart of the simultaneity issue and requires particular attention
in any RTW study even though o-ur methodology allows for a correction of these
problems. Ashenfelter and Pencavel used the percentage of a state's
Congressional delegation which was Democratic as a measure of attitudes
towards unions.12 We chose to use a similar but more sophisticated proxy.
The AFL-CIO publishes a so-called COPE rating for each Congressman based
on his/her voting record. Using this information, we derived our
own COPE rating for each state over five year periods based on the voting
behavior of a state's Congressional delegation on key labor issues over
that five year time. The variable was detrended so that the variable measures
preferences in the state relative to the national average over any five
year period. Changes in organization caused by movements in the national
average will be picked up on our time dumies as described below.
Freeman and Medoff have pointed out that an important feature of
local tastes and preferences which has been ignored in most empirical
work, is local employer oppostion.' In our work we include a variable,
TOUGH, which represents the number of unfair labor practice charges
filed against employers divided by the number of elections in each state. We also
include a five year average change in both TOUGH and COPE in our models.-16-
Finally, in our fifty state regression, region dummy variables are
also included to attempt to capture any differences in attitudes prevalent
in a particular region. The unique environment of the Southmay negatively
influence union organizing. This region may be difficult to organize
because of the nature, composition, and location of industry, the surplus
of low—income agricultural workers, the influence of racial prejudice,
the prevailing ideology, and the strong anti-union attitude existinqamong
Southern workers, employers, .and the community at large. We include
four region dummies to control for any geographic variation. In later
seven state reqressions we allow for individual state effects eliminating
any stationary differences across states.
Commons and Davis both pointed to economic conditions and cyclical
swings in employment and prices to explain union growth.14 Davis
postulated that grievances built up in downturns and could be acted upon
in the upswing. Both Davis and Ashenfelter—Pencavel suggested that sharp
price rises contributed to union growth. This latter finding is present
in several other works including Dunlop, Adams, and Krisklov.15 The
usual explanation for this findinc is that real wages fail to keep pace
with inflation and workers organize as a "defensive reaction." Price
changes may also be capturing business conditions or they may be co-
linear with the periods of "fundamental unrest," as emphasized by Dunlop.
Individual year dummies were included to capture effects of national
business cycle swings. It is difficult to capture the business cycleby
state because unemployment rate data are not available until late in the
period. Our principal proxy is the percentage change in the manufacturing—17-
weekly wage. Presumably this variable captures relative tightness of the
labor market in an area. We used two versions of this variable. The
five year average rate of growth in wages, TRENDW, is an attempt to
capture something of the long-run tightness of the market. %CHGW is
the change in wage relative to this lonq-run trend. This latter variable
is introduced to capture the cycle within the state.
No price indexes are available by state until late in our sample
period, thus we cannot test the hypothesis that rapid price increases
spur union organization. The impact of differences over time in the
national rate of inflation are captured by the individual year dummy
variables.
In states where there is long term employment growth, unions will
have to engage in more organizing if they are to keep pace. Thus we
created a long term growth rate of employment, EMRATE. To minimize
the cyclical component of any measure of employment growth we created
five year moving average annualized growth rates.
A partial adjustment accelerator model predicts a sharp fall in
organizing imediately after a RN law is passed and smaller declines
from the pre-law level in later years. We have separated the RTW
variable into a series of mutually exclusive dunrty variables designed to
capture the impact in five year intervals following passage of the law.
RTW1-5YR was 1 if and only if a RN law had been passed in the state
in the past five years. RTW6-1OYR was unity if a law was passed between
6 and 10 years previously and so on.-18-
We began by running regressions for all fifty states without additional
controls for fixed effects or a leading RTWindicatorto test for simul-
taneity. We then explored the potential problems that omitted variables
or simultaneity could be causing in these fifty state results by running
a separate set of regressions on the group of seven states where data
are available both before and after passage of a RTW law.
Fifty State Empirical Results
The results presented on Table 3 are consistent with the model we
have advanced. The dernooraphic variables performed as expected. In
states with fewer women or more blacks in the labor force there is
more organizing. A five percentiqe point change in these variables
will lead to a ten and three percent increase in organizing respectively.
Similarly, states with five percentage points more urban workers have four
percent more organization.
When structural variables representing the percentage of the work force
in one digit occupations or industries are included in the equation,
their coefficients are erratic and their effect on other variables minor.
The simple variable %BCW, representing the proportion of the work force
in blue collar occupations, performed better and was therefore included
instead of the more detailed measures.
Thetaste and preference variables captured a sizable proportion of
the explained variations in organizing. TOUGH performed exceptionally
well.States with one standard deviation higher level of TOUGH show
organization rates almost 10% lower. Morever, changes over time are
also quite important. States where employers are becoming increasingly-19-
TABLE 2
Variables Used in Empirical Work
ORG/LF employees in units choosing representation/non-agricultural
labor force in thousands
ELECT NLRB elections/non—agricultural labor force in thousands
PERC union victories/elections
WINSIZE employees in units choosing representation/union victories
EMPGROWTH average annual rate of growth of the non-agricultural work
force over five years
%BLACK percent of the labor force that is black
FEMALE percent of the labor force that is female
%URBAN percent of the population living in urban areas
%BCW percent of the labor force that is blue-collar
TOUGH number of employer unfair labor practices per election
COPE rating of the congressional delegation's votes on labor issues
NORTH dummy variable for Northern states
SOUTH dummy variable for Southern states
CENTRAL dummy variable for Central states
TRENDW average annual growth in the manufacturing weekly wages
over five years
CHGW difference between the proportionate change in wages in a
given year and TRENDW.
PRERTW dummy variable which is 1 in the 5 year period prior to
passage of a RTW law
RTWO-5YR dumy variable which is 1 only in the first 5 year period
after passage of a RTW law
RTWt-5YR dummay variable which is 1 only in the period t to 5 years
after a RTW law was passed
XXXX five year change in variable XXXXTABLE 3
Fifty State Regression Results on LN(MEMB)
MEAN COEFFICIENT
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Error)
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All regressions include A%FEMALE, %BLACK, A%BCW, L%URBAN, an intercept
and individual year dummies-"-
hostileto unionism, according to this measure, show reduced organiza-
tion. COPE, on the other hand, performed poorly. Neither levels or
changes seemed to affect organizing. TOUGH appears to dominate COPE.
If TOUGH is removed from the equation, COPE's performance improves con-
s iderably.
The region dumies show a surprising pattern. When controls,
we used for demographics, structure, tastes and preferences, and the
presence of a RTW law were included, SOUTH no longer has a negative
coefficient. Indeed the coefficient was higher than those for North
or West. Without these controls the variable was strongly negative.
The lower rate of organizing in the South therefore canapparently be
'explained" by the factors included in the equation.
The short run cyclical variable %CHGW, the difference between the
annual wage change and the long run trend, had the expected positive
sign d was significant. Wage growth which is 6% higher than average,
yields a 10% increase in organizing. The long run trend in wages had
no influence here. Je experimented with a variety of functional forms
using lagged values of %CHGW; none yielded satisfactory results.
As expected states with greater employment growth had higher levels
of organizing. A 10% growth rate in employment caused organizing to
grow by l7%.16 The yearly time dummies are not reported here, but
they show a strong negative trend. Relative to 1950, the 1977 dummy
shows that organization has fallen by 40%, other things equal.
Finally we turn to examine the impact of RN laws based on the
fifty state regression.-23-
The Effects of RTW
The coefficients on the RTW variables are quite consistent with
the hypothesis that the passage of a RTW law diminishes the equilibrium
level of unionism and that a partial adjustment model characterizes the
resulting changes in organizing. In the first five years following
passage of a RTW law in a state, organizing is reduced by 50%.In
the next five years, it is reduced by roughly 25%.In later years it
appears to be reduced somewh&t, though we do not have sufficient data
to conclude that the reduction is statistically significant.
Over our sample period, employees in new bargaining units average
2% of all union workers --i.e.the flow is roughly 2% per year. If
organizing falls by 50% for five years and 25% during the next five,
then after 10 years, membership will be roughly 7% lower than it would
have been otherwise. If 7% was the true long run reduction, then once
the new equilibrium is achieved organizing should be permanently depressed
by 7%.In our data, the standard errors on the dumy variables capturing
the impact of the laws after 10 years are typically around 8%. Thus
the modest 7% long term reduction could not show up as statistically
significant. The actual coefficients for the later years average closer
to 3 or 4%, though the coefficient designed to capture the period after
20 years is almost exactly what we would predict if RTW laws ultimately
caused a 7% decline in unionism (and organizing).
Thus, these results seem to be consistent with an interpretation
that RTW laws ultimately diminish membership by 5 to 10% --orunion
workers as a fraction of the total work force falls by between one and
three percentage points in most states. (This impact would be in addition
to the loss of membership that might occur if members of existing bargaining_2i1..
units choose not to be union members when union shop rules are eliminated.)
It is possible, however, that organizing is depressed only in the short
run. Then the stock would also be diminished only in the short-run. We
think it is more plausible that the stock is permanently reduced by 5 to 10%,
but other interpretations of the lonq-tern impact are possible.
If there is a permanent reduction in the stock, it is easy to
see that with the relatively small sample sizes available for the stock
equations estimated by previous authors, a statistically significant
impact amounting to 5% might not be detected. After all, the standard
errors in our equations which have considerably more observations make
measurements that precise impossible.
It is possible, however, that the results reported in these fifty
state regressions are spurious, and that either omitted variable bias
or simultaneity contaminates the results. We turn then to an examination
of these issues by exploring the impact of RTW laws in the seven states
where sufficient data on organizing is available both before and after
passage of the law to allow fixed effects and simultaneity tests.
Seven State Empirical Results
It seems unlikely that time invariant differences across states
could account for the results we have observed. Generally we would not
expectthat fixed state differences could generate the pattern of a
declining impactofRTW laws as timesincepassage increases. Nonetheless
our first step was to determine the impact of fixed effects on a regression
basedonly on these seven states. Those results appear on Table 4.-25-
TABLE 4
Seven State Results on RTW Coefficients








Note: All other variables included in Table 3 are included
here except YEAR variables which have been collapsed
to cover five year intervals.-to-
Becauseof the smaller number of observations, we needed to make some
minor changes in our specification. We collapsed our RTW variables to
cover a longer interval. We allowed five year time dummies rather than
the individual year dummies we used in the fifty state regression. As
an additional test, in these regressions we also controlled for first
order serial correlation and for heterskedasticity using the Parks method.
Thefixed effect results are remarkably similar to those found in
the fifty state regressions. In the first 10 years after passage, organ-
izing isdiminished 32% --afigure very similar to the 39% average for
the first decade obtained by averaginq the first two five year coefficients
in the fifty state regression. After a decade, the impact is insignificant,
as in the fifty state case. And once again a large standard error
leaves open the possibility that organizing remains depressed by
5 or 10% in the long run.
Thus, time invariant state differences do not seem to account for
the results we find. A second concern is that declining union strength
may allow passage of a RTtJ law. Thus reduced organizing and passage of
the law are both indications of recently reduced union power.In this
case, a leading indicator of impending passage of a RTW law provides
an important test. If declining union strength leads to reduced organizing
and to the passage of the law, then the period prior to its passage
ought to be one where organizing is depressed reflecting the declines
in union power. If the RTW law itself causes the declines, then there
ought to be no reduction in organizing in the period prior to passage.
We included a leading indicator, labeled PRE-RTW, as a exogeneity/
causality indicator in our seven state regression. This dummy variable-27-
took on the value of one only in the period five years before the passage
of a RTW law.It thus captures any changes in organizing just prior to
passage of a RTW law.
The results shown on Table 4 are quite striking. In the period
before the passage of RTW laws, organizing is not depressed. Indeed,
in these seven states, organizing was actually somewhat above average,
though the coefficient on PRE-RTW is not significant. The decline in
organizing seems to follow the passage of a RTW law, not precede it.
Indeed it is even possible that RN laws are passed when unions appear
to be becoming stronger (as evidenced by increased organizing) in order
to diminish their strength.
A look at two states where RTW laws were recently passed or repealed
offers some final evidence. In the three years prior to passage of
Louisanaa RTW law in 1976, an average of 4,024 workers were organized
each year; in the three years after, the figure averaged 2,380.
Indiana offers an ideal natural experiment because it is the only
state where a law was first passed and later repealed. Figure 3 reveals
a final bit of evidence that the effects of the law are real. Displayed
isthenumber of workers in newly certified bargaining units per1,000
non-agricultural workers. Two year moving averages were used to reduce
the variability of year-to-year fluctuations. There is a clear downward
trendin organizing in the state over the period before the RN law
was passed. The trend was interrupted by a sudden drop in organizing
in the period when the law was in effect. It promptly resumed after
the law was repealed.-28-
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Thus it appears that the results presented earlier are not the
product of omitted variable bias or simultaneity. They strongly sucigest
that organizing is dramatically depressed for roughly a decade after
passage of a right-to-work law and quite possibly is slightly reduced
permanently. The stock of union memberhsip falls between 5 and 10%
initially and this reduction may be permanent.
The obvious question remains as to how or why RTW laws have the
impact they do. We cannot infer the exact reasons why laws diminish
organizing so sharply in the short run. We can, however, decompose
the decline and shed some light on the mechanism.
Decomposition of RN Laws Impact
It is possible to decompose MEMB into several components and consider
the impact of RTW laws on each of these. The decomposition can be per-
formed as follows:
ORG/LF =#ELECTIOS/LFX WON/ELECTIONS X ORG/#WON
ORG/LF =ELECTX PERC X WINSIZE
The number of new members (per 1,000 non-agricultural workers)
obtained through elections is the product of the number of elections
times the percent of elections won by the union times the average size
of the bargaining unit where elections are won. We ran separate regres-
sions on all fifty states for each of these variables. The RN coeffi-
cients from the fifty state regression are provided in Table 5.
Right—to—work laws seem to have their most important impact in
reducing the number of elections held. Over half of the decline in-30-
TABLE 5
Fifty State Regressions -Decomposition
of Components in Ln ORG/LF
Ln(ORG/LF) ln(ELECT) ln(PERC) ln(WINSIZE)
RTW5YR -.531 -.288 -.054 -.189
(.093) (.045) (.025) (.079)
RTW1OYR -.263 -.130 .015 -.148
(.078) (.038) (.021) (.067)
RTW15YR .040 .055 .004 -.019
(.080) (.039) (.022) (.068)
RTW2OYR -.026 -.024 .018 -.020
(.084) (.041) (.023) (.072)
RTW25+YR -.075 -.135 .040 .019
(.071) (.034) (.019) (.061)
SEE .638 .308 .173 .543
R2 .367 .444 .371 .410
Note: All regressions included all the variables listed in Table 3.-31-
new membership in the ten years after passage can be attributed to a
decline in elections. The remainder of the effect is accounted for
largely by a reduction in the average size of units won. Over the
first decade after passage WINSIZE is reduced by roughly 16%.Interest-
ingly, the laws have only a small effect on the proportion of elections
won.
If employees are oraanied up to some threshold where expected benefits
equal expected costs, an increase in costs or reduction in benefits
will surely cause a decrease in elections.If larger bargaining units
are more difficult to organize, presumably a change in the organizational
environment could result in the medium and smaller units being organized
first.In general, we would not expect much change in the winning per-
centage. Presumably, unions organize plants up to some point where they
have a certain probability of winning. Organizers almost never call
elections until they have 65 percent of the workers to sign cards in
support of the unions. If this is the stopping rule, then the winning
percentage is unlikely to vary substantially.
Thus organizing is clearly reduced in the short-run with fewer
elections and smaller winning unit sizes. The ultimate question is
why? The most obvious explanation is simply that passage of a RTW
law makes union membership less attractive. Without the ability to
enforce payment of dues or to fine those who cross the picket line,
unions may prove less powerful. Their strike threats are diminished
both by reduced financial resources and by less certain participation.
As a result after a right-to-work law is passed, membership is sharply-32-
reduced as plants formerly at the margin are now far removed from it.
There is a second interpretation which arose in discussions with
those on both sides of the controversy. A major part of the law's
impact may be through the pyschological/symbolic effectpassage of a
RTW law may have on workers. Successful organization requires thata
few workers inside a plant take a highly visible and activist role.
The costs to these activists can be enormous, ranging from harrassment
to loss of their jobs. Even those who are not activists must take the
highly visible step of signing an authorization card. And in considering
whether or not to vote for a union, workers often fear they will lose
their jobs or suffer other costs if their company is hostile. Thus
the perceived strength of the union may be critical to the willingness
of activists and others to become involved in an organizing drive. A
highly visible defeat such as the passage of a RTW law (or the crushing
of PATCO) may severely damage the union's credibility and appeal to
workers. There is at least some evidence that the psychological impact
may be important. In Missouri, for example, after a RTW law was defeated,
new organizing jumped dramatically.
Conclusion
Our results show a strong short-run reduction in union organizing
following the passage of a RTW law. Ommitted variable bias and simul-
taneity problems do not skew our findings. Organizing is reduced by
nearly 50% in the first five years after passage of a RN law and by
half that amount in the subsequent five. Overall our results suggest
that membership in unions is reduced between 5 and 10% afterpassage.
The findings are consistent with a permanent reduction of this magnitude—33-
in the stock though it is also possible that the stock gradually recovers
over many decades.It appears that right-to-work laws are not merely
symbols. They have real significant effects.-34-
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Footnotes (continued)
16. This result does not imply that new organization is more common
among new workers. On the contrary, it suggests a very low rate of
organizing among new workers. With no employment growth, roughly
2 percent of the work force are organized each year. With 10 percent
annual growth in employment, unions should organize a third of the
new workers—-or 3 percent of the labor force—-in addition to the pre-
vious 2 percent, just to maintain their relative share of the work
force. Instead organizing rises only to 2.5 percent. This result
may in part reflect simultaneity. Firms are moving to the areas
where organizing is difficult.